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Is there really a problem of God?  To answer the question either 
in the affirmative or in the negative posits more problems than 
provide a viable solution. If such a difficulty is really a predicament, 
a more pressing question emerges, how are we supposed to conduct 
our investigation? Moreover, how are we to raise and formulate our 
questions considering God, a “Being” that prominent thinkers held 
to be as “that which nothing greater can be thought to exist”? The 
very history of philosophy is replete with reflections and voluminous treatises that speaks about God’s existence, His nature, His attributes, 
His actions, His relevance to human existence and history, and quite recently, even the notion of God as Non-Being.1 Indeed, the God-
problem has been a perennial question that has haunted the affairs of the intellect.2  The mind operates in a discursive manner, in a way that it incessantly searches about cause and effects, possibilities 
and necessities, and creation and termination, further directing it 
towards an Absolute Being, an Indubitable Truth, the anchor of all 
existences – A Divine Being: GOD. The question of God is like any 
other philosophic problem, although it transcends the limits and 
scope of a strictly scientific investigation.
Longstanding debates and intellectual debacles have prospered 
rendering the subject matter a parody of meaningless talks and a display of trivialities.3 The celebrated arguments of St. Anselm4  and Rene Descartes5 opted for a fool-proof, self-sustaining argument 
that elevates the discourse on God beyond the realm of doubt. On 
1 Jean-Luc Marion, together with other French theologians who are deeply influenced by 
phenomenology, represents a significant shift in the course of 20th or modern theology.  Speaking from a 
standpoint of a “New Theology” or Nouvelle Theologie, they argue that God must be thought of through 
the pure reception and expression of his word, which, they strongly held, gives the opportunity of God 
giving Himself.  Notice that this strictly theological assumption requires no foundations from philosophy, 
and it further presupposes that metaphysical categories are not proper to attribute to God, not even the 
metaphysical notion of Being.  Thus, for Jean-Luc Marion, God is without Being.  Cf. John Milbank, “Only 
Theology Overcomes Metaphysics” in New Blackfriars. Vol. 76, No. 895 (1995): p. 325-341.
2 Immanuel Kant argues that the problem of God, together with the problems of Freedom and 
Immortality, has been the constant preoccupation of the philosophers since time immemorial. God, he argues, is the conditioned unity of all categorical concepts and notions present in the idea of an 
absolute being. This he strongly argue because the mind, according to Kant, has a natural tendency 
to raise such problems. Such may be the case, but Kant neither wishes to eradicate nor attempts to 
disregard this tendency.  Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. N.K. Smith (tr.).  (London: n.p., 
1933), p. 39-45.3 Friedrich Nietzsche, among many others, was the first one to attack seriously the claims of 
philosophy, theology, and religion about the existence and nature of God. In his critique of culture, 
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the other hand we see St. Thomas Aquinas questioning the very 
integrity of St. Anselm’s position while opting for a cosmological 
argument.6 And also, there is no lack of philosophers who argue on 
the contrary. David Hume and Immanuel Kant who strongly argued 
in their works the impossibility of a rational process to demonstrate 
the existence of a something that is placed, by supposition, outside 
the world of the appearances, that is, of the phenomenal world.A veritable branch of philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, is 
a recent development in the study of religious phenomena and the 
relevance of a belief in God. Heidegger himself recognized this in his 
early work “Phenomenology of the Religious Life”. Interest in this 
particular discipline is definitely at a constant growth.  In his lectures, 
Heidegger enumerated three tendencies of the philosophy of religion, 
namely, the Psychological, the Epistemological, the Philosophy of History, and lastly, the Metaphysical.7 In the Psychological tendency, 
the religious phenomenon is treated as a phenomenon, a moment, 
free from any social or theological theories.  They are to be considered 
apart from any liturgical activities, cults, and even religious figures, 
preachers or reformers. The moment is to be characterized in their 
transcendental and primal conditions.8 The Epistemological on the 
other hand investigates the rational lawfulness or reasonableness of 
any religious ideas and its formation. Heidegger holds on to the fact that this is the tendency of Catholic and Protestant Theology because 
both systems work to speculate and within their own tradition an 
understanding of the message of Christianity. “It is their (Catholic 
and Protestant Theology) prejudice to think that they are able to 
settle the problem of theology with a quick sweeping hand.”9 Thirdly, Philosophy of History regards the realization of the religious a priori in the history of spirituality and the spiritual life. In this tendency, not 
Nietzsche emphasizes how the very idea of God corrupted man and his culture. He used to believe that 
Christianity is certainly one of the purest manifestations of an impulse towards true culture, towards 
the production of a Creative Genius (the unity of the Dionysian and the Apollonian), towards the ever 
renewed production of the Saint. However, Christianity, though a massive force, is already a spent one. 
Nietzsche strongly believes that such a force has been used by the State and, in the process, became hopelessly degenerate. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy. Clifton P. Fadiman (tr.). (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1995), p. 64-67. 4 In the Proslogion, St. Anselm constructed an argument for the existence of God which is at 
once philosophical and spiritual. The bishop in Anselm moved him in incessant prayers that prepared 
for an argument on God’s existence that even the fool would understand. 5 In the Meditations, Descartes argued that existence is a predicate of God. We cannot think of 
God as non-existent. It is like thinking of a triangle devoid of three sides. Such assertions were able to 
invite much controversies instead of putting to rest the issue. In fact, the talk about an “Ontological 
Proof” was inaugurated by Descartes himself. 6 Like the monk Gaunilon, St. Thomas Aquinas argued the insufficiency of St. Anselm’s proof. 
The shifting of the premises from the realm of ideas to the reality is unacceptable for Aquinas. 7 The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p. 13-21. 8 Ibid., p. 15.
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only the mere facts are considered, but more so, the laws according 
to which religion develops historically.10 “But only on the basis of the 
separation of the psychological from the a priori can one trace the 
historical necessity of what is religious.”11 And lastly the Metaphysical 
idea of God which, for Heidegger, is the basis of all of our experiences 
in the world. The demand to posit the existence of God “arrives from 
the teleological context of (transcendental) consciousness to one 
last meaning.”12 For Heidegger, the last one, the Metaphysical, is the 
authentic Philosophy of Religion.  Not only does in the metaphysical 
where all three regions of the psychological, epistemological, and 
historical meet but more so it speaks of the relevance of God as 
intimately related to Dasein’s ownmost facticity.
The Problem of God is intimately related to the problem of man.  For 
certain, there are dimensions of the human person that directly relates 
him to the problem of God. Perhaps no other philosophical framework 
has succinctly pondered on the relation of the human person and his 
openness to reality as Phenomenology. As Ferguson puts it: “Man is not 
an entity enclosed within himself: he is being open to the universe.  We 
do not experience the existence of the universe as something added to 
the experience of the subject.”13 It is phenomenology that puts to rest 
the problem of reality and expression that plagued philosophers across 
the centuries by stressing the eminence of intentionality.  It is possible 
to have things without men, however, it is impossible for men to exist 
without things. “Men without things”, Finlayson continues, “would be 
like contra-human beings. The reality of things constitutes thus the 
formal constitutive of a human dimension.”14
 Martin Heidegger’s approach to the problem of God proved 
to be a unique one in philosophy. Immersing himself in the study of 
phenomenology under the guidance of no less than Edmund Husserl 
himself and the traditions of Scholasticism, Heidegger was able to re-evaluate the validity of concepts and philosophico-theological 
systematizations about Being. Even before the publication of “Being 
and Time” in 1927, Heidegger rose to prominence in Germany on the 
basis of his reputation as a professor of philosophy. A number of his 
former students, like Karl Lowith, Hannah Arendt, and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, to name a few, have praised him for his originality to disengage 
 9 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 10  Ibid. P. 17.  Heidegger points to us that Hegel was the first philosopher to envisage this objective,
but the grand narrative and constructive method of the German Idealist has to be rejected.  11 Ibid.
 12 Ibid., p. 19. 13 Clarence Finlayson. “The Problem of God”.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.  Vol. 9,
No. 3, “Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy”.  (March 1949), p. 423. 14 Ibid.
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interpretation of the seminal thinkers of the past from conventional 
assumptions of the contemporary academia.15 Barash reports of 
Heidegger’s former students saying that his “critical appraisal of 
traditional, culturally oriented contemporary philosophy was warmly 
received among students and younger professors who, following the 
devastations of World War I, questioned the soundness of the Western 
cultural heritage and the purport of any attempt to evaluate philosophy 
in relation to its contemporary cultural significance.”16 Heidegger is neither a theist17 nor an atheist,18 because for him 
theism and atheism discourses made possible within the ambit of a 
metaphysical tradition that he, first and foremost, wished to surpass. 
Heidegger’s thinking first develops from an attempt to lay the foundations 
of metaphysics, only to go beyond it in the end.  Being is hiddenness, as 
defined and constricted in this technological age, and it is a must that 
we must no longer seek the answer to the question “What is Being?” 
from traditional ontotheological answer that God is the ultimate cause, 
the ultimate end, and the ultimate ground of everything. Heidegger, as 
evidenced from his later writings, strongly suggests that metaphysics 
and theology are interrelated for they both arise from the desire to 
conceal the question of Being by concentrating on beings.  
The later writings of Heidegger focused on expressing The Holy 
(das Heilige) without, even for a single moment, discussing the existence of God.19 Thus, in the Heideggerian framework, God must not be thought 
of as being, no, not even a supreme being, as his predecessors have 
done. He believes that such metaphysical way of understanding about 
God redirects the mind from an authentic thinking of Transcendent 
and the Holy. The Holy, Heidegger believes, is a manifestation of Being, 
and his discussion on the “flight of the gods” speaks about the oblivion 
of Being that arises from man’s attempt to master technologically all 
beings. He puts this most emphatically in his letter to Ingeburg Bottger. 
 15 A detailed treatment of Heidegger’s prominence as a teacher was discussed by Jeffrey 
Andrew Barash in “Martin Heidegger in the Perspective of the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the 
Heidegger Gesamtausgabe.” The Journal of Modern History.  Vol. 64, no. 1.  (1992). 16 Ibid., p. 54 17 In his letter to Fr. Engelbert Krebs he unhesitatingly told him that it has become problematic 
for him to accept the doctrines of the Church.  To quote a passage from the letter: “Epistemological 
insights that pass over into the theory of historical knowledge have made the system of Catholicism 
problematic and unacceptable to me – but not Christianity and metaphysics, although I take this latter 
in a new sense.” Cf. Charles Guignon, The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 71-72.  Sheehan, the contributor, quoted this letter wholly from Hugo 
Ott’s Martin Heidegger Unterwegs zu Seiner Biographie. (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988), pp. 106-107. 18 Martin Heidegger protests vehemently when Jean-Paul Sartre, in his lecture entitled 
“Existentialism and Humanism”, categorized him as an atheist existentialist. Heidegger remarked that Sartre failed to understand his philosophy.
 19 “Hölderlin’s questioning proximity to German Idealist philosophy gives his work the singular 
status of being other than metaphysical thinking in a way that directly feeds into Heideggerian 
destruction.” Timothy Clark, Martin Heidegger.  (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 99.
 20   Letter of Martin Heidegger to Ingeburg Bottger dated 25 February 1968.  Cf. Ibid., 97.
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In that letter, Heidegger says: “Behind the technological world there is 
a mystery. This world is not just a creation of human beings. No one 
knows whether and when humans will ever experience this emptiness 
as ‘sacred empty’.  If suffices that this relation remains open.”20 Thus, the 
statement “God is dead” means a lot more different for Heidegger. The 
Holy is not yet “revealed” to us the mystery of the divine indispensable 
for our own facticity.
On the Essence of Poetry: Heidegger’s Holderlin
For the Greeks, particularly Plato, beauty was that radiant 
light that encompassed all things, and to quote, “it is that mystery 
which is rightly accounted blessed beyond all others.”21  Inseparable 
from being, beauty was something integral in understanding the 
consciousness of the ancient world. Indeed, for Plato, “love of transcendent beauty even guided the actions of the gods; all true love (eros) was nothing other than the love of beauty.”22 Heidegger 
even reminds us saying: “for the Greeks being and beauty meant the 
same thing (presence is pure radiance).”23 However, for Heidegger, 
the modern world has lost this sight of beauty, the beauty that is 
inseparable from Being.  Beauty is no longer the supreme radiance 
of beings, but rather “the beautiful is that which reposes and relaxes; 
it is intended for enjoyment and art is a matter of for pastry cooks.”24 
Even modern aesthetics is another example of the oblivion of Being. 
It has manifested the forgetfulness of the radiant emergence of Being 
from concealment into unconcealment. Moderns fail to understand 
that beauty is a “lofty manner of Being, which here means the pure-
arising-on-its-own and shining.”25 He maintains that beauty is not a 
property, that is, something that can be added to a being as a mere 
attribute, rather he insists that it is the “supreme radiance” of a thing. 
But we may now ask, what is the meaning of these reflections in the 
context of the problem of Being pronounced in “Being and Time”?
It cannot be denied that Heidegger’s most monumental work, 
Sein und Zeit, made an immediate and powerful impact upon the 
philosophic public. The book seemed to be prelude to a grand new 
metaphysical system, and philosophers alike expected subsequent 
works to complete this grand metaphysics. The expectation of the 
public was even heightened when Heidegger announced that the 
 21 “Phaedrus” in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, 250b.
 22 “Symposium”, ibid., 201a.
 23  Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 132.
 24  Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 131.
 25  Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 132.
 26 “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 200.
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published part of “Being and Time” was only a first part of a projected 
work. Philosophers are excited. When would the promised “Second 
Part” appear?  And of course, what would be the systematic results for 
philosophy after the dramatic and sensational analyses of “Being and 
Time”? As we all know, these expectations were never fulfilled. The 
second part of “Being and Time” was never published and the very 
nature of Heidegger’s later thinking came to a preclude any possibility 
of a grand metaphysical system. As we have seen in our previous 
discussion, the seeds of the dissolution and destruction of metaphysics 
was already very pronounced in “Being and Time.” Yet a work that 
claims to re-open the ancient question of the meaning of Being did not 
quite properly seem to promise a new system of metaphysics.  If the 
question of the meaning of Being is to be raised once more, why not 
then give some comprehensive answer to the question?
While the philosophical public waited in vain for such a system, 
Heidegger in the early 1930’s turn instead to a study of poetry, 
particularly of the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. In one of his essays 
Heidegger asked: “And why poets in a desolate time? . . . Today we 
hardly understand the question. How are we ever to grasp the answer 
that Hölderlin gives?”26  The first essay on Hölderlin appeared in 1937 
to be followed throughout the 1940’s by a series of other studies of 
this poet.  In fact, we can conclude that his concern for poetry, far from 
being a passing fad, has become a more consuming involvement over 
the years. No wonder he wrote in the Preface to the fourth edition of 
“Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry: “the present elucidations do not 
claim to be contributions to research in the history of literature or to 
aesthetics. They spring from a necessity of thought.”27
It is beyond doubt that Nietzsche and Hölderlin, the solitary 
thinker and the solitary poet, are the two great individuals that has 
occupied the thinking of Heidegger after “Being and Time.” These 
two, the thinker and the poet, are akin to each other. In fact they 
share the same destiny. Both are passionate lovers of anything that is Hellenistic, they have been dazzled by the light of Greece, and both 
eventually succumbed to the darkness of psychosis. His reading of 
Nietzsche culminates in the claim that Nietzsche is the last thinker 
of Western metaphysics. It was he who brings together the motives 
and aims that have driven the history of metaphysics. His will-to-
power bears testimony to this. Hölderlin on the other hand, whom he 
regarded as the “Swabian Nietzsche,”28  is open to a new and original 
future “beyond” metaphysics in a way Nietzsche is not.29 Thus for 
Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poetry is for us a fateful destiny.
 27 Elucidations to Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. Ii.
 28 Cf. “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 205.
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Heidegger’s involvement with Hölderlin is no departure from 
philosophy but it signals the entrance into his most real philosophic 
problems. And what, we may ask is the role of the poet Hölderlin? 
His role is that of a guide. He leads from one place to another. He is a 
bridge. The artist, as Heidegger himself explained in one of his essays: 
“The artist is not an origin because he is also a craftsman but rather because of the setting-forth (Her-stellen) of works and the setting-forth 
of equipment happen in that bringing forth which allows beings, by 
assuming an appearance, to come forth into their presence.”30 But even 
apart from Hölderlin’s themes, the philosophic quest of Heidegger 
would have led him to think about poetry.  For the poet, he said, gives voice to Being;31 and for Heidegger the beginning and end of philosophy 
is always the problem of Being.
But why focus on Hölderlin? Why, in unveiling the essence of 
poetry, choose Hölderlin as the essential poet?  Heidegger himself posits 
these questions asking: “Why choose Hölderlin’s work if our purpose is 
to show the essence of poetry? Why not Homer or Sophocles, why not 
Virgil or Dante, why not Shakespeare or Goethe? Surely the essence of 
poetry has come to rich expression in the works of these poets, more so 
indeed than in Hölderlin’s creation, which broke off so prematurely and 
abruptly.”32 For Heidegger, the choice of Hölderlin is an arbitrary one. 
He regarded the persona as the one whose poetic mission is to make 
poems solely about the essence of poetry.  In this sense, he is the poet’s poet.33 Quite a few philosophers greeted with suspicion this original 
adventure into the realm of poetry. Heidegger seems to be laying aside 
the concerns and problems of philosophy which he himself posited 
in order to indulge himself in the sensuous and emotional luxuries of 
poetry.  But this is not the case. In fact, what Heidegger saw in Hölderlin is the capacity for language to speak of Being.  
Man’s being is grounded in language; but this actually occurs in 
conversation.  Conversation, however, is not only way in which language 
takes place, but rather language is essential only as conversation.  What 
we usually mean by “language,” namely a stock of words and rules for 
combining them, is only an exterior aspect of language. But now, what 
is meant by “conversation”? Obviously, the act of speaking with one 
another about something. Speaking, then, mediates our coming to one 
another. . . . We are a conversation, that always signifies we are one 
conversation. The unity of conversation consists in the fact that in the 
 29 In his commentary of “Remembrance” he wrote: “We must, on the contrary, learn to 
understand Hölderlin’s distinction as presaging in the overcoming of metaphysics.” Elucidations to 
Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 111. 30 “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 35. 31 “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 200.
 32 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 52. 33 Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 52-53.
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essential word there is always manifest that one and the same on which 
we agree, on the basis of which we are united and so are authentically 
ourselves. Conversation and its unity support our existence.34
Nothing could be more traditional than this assertion against Heidegger and the suspicion that thinking loses its rigor if it deals 
with the poets and poetry. At the very dawn of Western philosophy we 
saw Plato relegating poetry to the realm of unreality in comparison 
with philosophy. This denigration of poetry is definitely not Plato’s 
propaganda against poetry, rather, it is an inevitable consequence of 
Platonic dualism between the World of Ideas and the world of the 
senses. The former consisting of eternal ideas while the latter of the 
fleeting and the changing data of the senses, with which, as we all know, 
the practicing artist, and the poet for that matter, is involved. Since 
that which endures, the eternal, is more valuable compared to what 
is fleeting and transitory, the temporal, the realm of ideas has a fuller 
reality than the world of sense. Hence, having this kind of dualism, 
all art, in opposition to what is rational and demonstrative, traffics in 
the shadowy and unreal world of the senses. This Platonic doctrine, 
sometimes more openly and sometimes more subtle, has infected the 
philosophic view of poetry since the beginning of Western thought.35 
Contrary to what Plato held, for Heidegger poetry is essentially a 
revelation. Every human reality, because it is temporal, is also historical; 
and for him, poetry, as a historical reality, has raised the fundamental 
problem of man and his destiny in a manner that is at once startling 
and astonishing. No wonder, in his readings of Hölderlin, he reflects: 
“Whatever man brings about and pursues is earned and is merited by 
his own efforts. ‘Yet’– says Hölderlin is sharp opposition – all this does 
not touch the essence of his dwelling on the earth, all this does not 
reach into the ground of human existence. Human existence is ‘poetic’ 
in its ground.”36 This insistence on man’s dwelling on earth as “poetic” 
resounds in Hölderlin in its most extreme and uncanny form. That is 
why Heidegger has singled him out as the poet of the poets: “the poet of 
poetry itself in the sense that he is involved with the very fate of poetry.”37 
In highlighting how the poet was able to express the spirit 
of the age, of what Heidegger referred to as the age of nihilism, he 
quoted a passage from Hölderlin’s poems:
Much has man experienced. 
 34 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 56-57. 35 For a detailed explanation of Plato’s attack against the arts and its relation to Heidegger, see 
William Barrett, What is Existentialism?  (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 127-129. 36 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 60. 37 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 54.
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Named many of the heavenly ones,
Since we have been a conversation
And able to hear from one another.38
Heidegger explained the passage saying:
Since we have been in a conversation – man has experienced much 
and named many gods.  Since language has authentically come to pass 
as conversation, the gods have to expression and a world has appeared.  
But again it is important to see that the presence of the gods and the 
appearance of the world are not merely a consequence of the occurrence 
of language; rather, they are simultaneous with it.  And this to the extent 
that it is precisely in the naming of the gods and in the world becoming 
word that authentic conversation, which we ourselves are, consists. . . . 
Only because the gods bring our existence to language do we enter the 
realm of the decision concerning whether we are to promise ourselves to 
the gods or whether we are to deny ourselves to them.39
 
What Heidegger refers to the “promise of ourselves to the gods” is 
actually what the poets saw in the age of nihilism. Since the presence of 
the gods and the appearance of the world are not merely consequences 
of the occurrence of language, the divine sign, so to speak, must be 
discovered within the world by surprise. “The gods who ‘once were 
here’ ‘return’ only at a ‘proper time’ and in immediacy–namely, when 
there is a turn among men in the right place and in the right way.”40 
The divine sign, in all its rigor and complexity, does not make sense for 
the thinker. Yet, as one commentator says, “if only to be taken as a sign, it is already received and thus, if not understood, at least translated 
into language, that is the language of signs.”41 The poet expresses not 
the sense of words nor of language actually pronounced by a god who 
would already speak a language similar to the common language of 
mortals, but the sense of being a sign of what is addressed – the passing-
by of god as the sign of god. Heidegger himself pointed this out in his 
interpretation of another passage from Hölderlin:
They are, you say, like the wine-god’s sacred priests,
Who roamed from land to land during the sacred night.42For Heidegger, this passage speaks of poet’s capacity to detect this 
passing-by of god which happens in a flash.  In his commentary he said: 
“Poets are mortals who gravely sing the wine-god and sense (spüren) 
 38 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 56.
 39 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 57-58. 40 “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 201. 41 Marc Froment-Meurice, That is to Say: Heidegger’s Poetics.  (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), p. 90.
 42 “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 202.
San Beda_Scientia Journal.indd   179 6/11/2013   1:48:06 PM
M
. A
. T
. A
ng
el
es
180
the track (Spur) of the fugitive gods; they stay on god’s track, and so they blaze (spuren) a path for their mortal relations, a path toward the 
turning point.”43 Situating himself between men and the gods, the poet 
can thus be described as a “demigod,” not half god and half man similar 
to a mythological character, by someone in-between, so that for the 
first time the dimension in which men and the gods turn toward and 
against each other thus inhabit the same region is opened.44 
Heidegger too speaks of intimacy, the intimacy of the poet to the 
gods, men, earth, and sky. In his elucidation of fragmentary draft of 
Hölderlin dating from 1800 which reads:
But man dwells in huts and wraps himself with a modest garment, 
for the more intimate he is,/the more attentive too, and that he preserves 
the spirit as the heavenly flame./Everything is intimate.45
 
Heidegger comments upon the phrase saying:
Who is man? Who is the poet? He is the one who must bear witness 
to what he is. To bear witness can signify to testify, but it also means to be 
answerable for what one has testified in one’s testimony. Man is he who 
is precisely in the attestation of his own existence. . . . But what should 
man and the poet testify to?  To his belonging to the earth.  This belonging 
consists in the fact that man is the inheritor, and the learner of all things.  . . 
. The attestation of belonging to this intimacy occurs through the creation 
of the world and through its rise, as well as through its destruction.46 
What the passage means is that without the poets no one can perceive 
the signs of the gods. However, without an other who would perceive and 
receive the language of the poet, it would fall into nothingness. This other 
must not himself be a poet, yet he must be sensitive to poetry. These 
others, as Heidegger emphasized, are not only a people or individuals. 
They are first and foremost exceptional individuals who are meditative 
and patient, who would be companions on the voyage, neighbours who 
are nonetheless different from the poet.47
With his constant evocation of the “need” of the gods, Heidegger 
recognized in Hölderlin the fundamental experience of a longing of 
man for the coming of a new god. Towards the end of his essay on 
“The Essence of Poetry”, he remarked:
 43 “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 202. 44 Froment-Meurice, loc. cit. 45 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 53-54. 46 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 54. 47 Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 58-59. Froment-Meurice, in his study of Heidegger, 
pointed out that these “meditative individuals” are the Germans, whom Heidegger considered as “people 
of poetry and thought.” Froment-Meurice, op. cit., p. 91.
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Hölderlin puts into poetry the essence of poetry – but not in the 
sense of a timelessly valid concept. This essence of poetry belongs to a 
definite time. But not in such a way that it merely conforms to that time 
as already existing. Rather, by providing anew the essence of poetry, 
Hölderlin first determines a new time. It is the time of the gods who have 
fled and the god who is coming. It is the time of need because it stands in 
double lack and double not: the no-longer of the gods who have fled and 
in the not-yet of the coming.
The essence of poetry which is founded by Hölderlin is historical 
in the highest degree, because it anticipates a historical time. As a 
historical essence, however, it is the only true essence.48
This experience goes well beyond the simple nomination of 
the gods or the divines. Not only are the divine and sacred names 
lacking, but also they give no feeling at all if they are coming once 
more. This is the kind of nausea that the poet Hölderlin was able to 
present and he was able to present it within time and temporality 
– within the course of human history. Hölderlin is “the poet of the 
night of the world,”49 this present stage to which history has brought 
to us: the night from which all the gods have departed and where 
the god to be has not yet arrived, the night in which man must stand 
in somber and lucid courage before nothingness, before the age of 
nihilism that Nietzsche himself prophesied. So too for Heidegger, the 
thinker and philosopher, nothingness is not a meaningless word, a 
mere negative concept, or just a passing emotional vapour.  Rather, 
it is a real historical and philosophical problem that man faces now as never before in history.
Heidegger and Holderlin’s Das Heilige
As was already propounded in the previous discussion, 
Heidegger’s choice of Hölderlin as the essential poet is a most crucial 
one. Hölderlin was able to express in the language of poetry what 
nihilism is, and this was expressed most clearly in his reference to the 
“flight of the gods”, the “passing-by of god, and the god’s impending 
“return.” We all know very well that the metaphysical problematic 
formulated in “Being and Time” insists at the uncovering of the 
fundamental structures that determine the Being of all beings qua 
being, his most devoted articulation on the ontical and the ontological. 
Insofar as one can talk of a major shift in Heidegger’s thinking, away 
from “philosophy of existence” or of dasein and towards a kind of 
poetic-meditative thinking of the history of Being, towards a paradigm 
for which the Pre-Socratics, namely Parmenides and Heraclitus, and 
 48 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 64.
 49 Barrett, op. cit., p. 132.
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the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin provided the main source of 
inspiration. Gone is the angst-ridden individual who takes up upon 
himself the experience of nothingness and guilt, of his own death and the struggle for care and authenticity.50 In the place of dasein, now we 
have the wanderer on forest paths, pondering the mysteries of the 
German landscape and rivers, meditating upon the words of poets 
and waiting upon for a new revelation of Being.51
Heidegger in fact is very careful in equating Being with God.  His 
philosophic acumen during the 1930’s up until the 1940’s is devoted to a negative attitude against Christian philosophy and theology.52 
Heidegger himself would have almost resisted to the idea that what 
he was attempting to think and develop through was a topic within 
the realm of Christian theology. However, in a study conducted by 
Karl Lowith, he remarked that the Being of that has such a prominent 
role in the philosophy of Heidegger, particularly in his later writings, 
behaves in a manner very similar to the biblical God.53 It dwells in 
mystery and cannot be explained but only evoked: it is the ultimate 
ground for there-being something rather than nothing.  It is that which 
disposes the epochs of history, it is that which we have forgotten but 
which we may hope, will reveal itself again in a new, future advent.54   
However, although Heidegger himself resisted the assimilation 
of his way of questioning to the agenda of theology and Christian 
philosophy, he would have no problem acknowledging that the aims 
and methods of his way of thinking were very different from those of 
academic conventional philosophies. In a pursuit of essential thinking, 
Heidegger employed different methodologies. One of the most striking is his radical re-reading of the Pre-Socratics, a re-reading that generally involve bold translations of the original texts that have greatly scandalized classicists.55 Another is his use of poetry as a source of 
philosophical reflection. Amongst the poets, Hölderlin has this singular 
pre-eminence.  However, he made it very clear that despite the essential 
proximity between the domains of thinking and poetry, they were, first 
 50 This is most pronounced in Being and Time, but, to the surprise of those philosophers waiting 
for the second half, Heidegger seemed to have abandoned his project. 51 In the untitled first page of Off the Beaten Track (Holwege), Heidegger assumes a poetic 
stance in explaining why he gave such a title. “Wood is an old name for forest. In the wood there are 
paths, mostly overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where wood is untrodden. They are called 
Holwege. Each goes its separate way, though within the same forest.  It often appears as if one is 
identical to another. But it only appears so. Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths. They 
know what it means to be on a Holzweg.” Off the Beaten Track, p. V.
 52 Cf. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 8-15. 53  This remark given by Lowith was discussed substantially by Hemming. Cf. Laurence Paul 
Hemming, “Heidegger’s God” in The Thomist.  Vol. 62, (1998): p. 375-377. 54  Ibid., p. 377. 55 Safranski expressed the distrust of some scholars on the translation given by Heidegger on the 
Greeks. Cf. Safranksi, op. cit., p. 149-150.
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and foremost, essentially distinct. In 1951, he wrote in the Preface to 
the 2nd edition of the Elucidations the following:
These attempts at the elucidation of several of Hölderlin’s 
poems, published separately until now, are gathered together here in 
their unaltered form.
These elucidations belong to the dialogue of thinking (Denken) 
with a form of poetry (Dichten) whose historical uniqueness can never 
be proved by the history of literature, but which can be pointed out by 
the dialogue with thinking (Denken).56 
Heidegger is very clear here.  As a thinker, never did he affirm to 
himself that he is a poet or that he is thinking poetically, rather, in the 
manner of a thinker, to think through the poetic language of the poet. And he is thinking only on those things that the poet had to give.57 
Hölderlin’s poetry has such a decisive significance for 
Heidegger. It has to do with the understanding of poetic identity and 
of the poetic word that the poet is given to speak that Heidegger 
finds most articulated in a very unique way in Hölderlin.  
As the founding of being, poetry is bound in a twofold sense.  In 
viewing this most intimate law, we must grasp its essence and its entirety.  
“. . .and hints are, from time immemorial, the language of the gods.”  
The poet’s saying is the intercepting of these hints, in order to pass 
on to his people. The intercepting of these hints is a receiving, and yet at 
the same time, a new giving: for in the “first signs” the poet catches sight of 
what has been completed, and boldly puts what he has seen into his word 
in order to foretell what is not yet fulfilled.58
This understanding is embedded in the complex themes of 
Hölderlin’s own poetic realm which includes the identity and fate of 
the German nation, the flight of the gods, the rivers of the German 
landscape, the place of man’s dwelling on earth, and the “Event” (Ereignis) of human understanding.  He summarized the content of 
the Hölderlin’s poetic word in the introduction saying: “It’s word is: the Holy (das Heilige). It speaks of the flight of the gods. It speaks 
of the protection that the gods who have flown give us until we are 
minded to and capable of dwelling in their proximity.  This word is 
what is most characteristic of home (Heimat).”59 
Two of Heidegger’s lectures lecture series on Hölderlin involves 
the latter’s poems about the river, the Rhein (der Rhein) and The Ister 
 56  Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 21. 57  Elucidations to Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 61. 58  Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 63.
 59 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 176-177.
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(der Ister), a title which involves the Latin and Greek name of the River Danube.60 These poems have such a prominent place in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Hölderlin’s poems because there is an inner affinity 
between the essence of the rivers and the poet himself.61  
In these poems, the rivers are presented, according to 
Heidegger, as demigods, descending from the mountains to the land 
below, shaping it and watering it and making it fit for habitation by 
mortals.62 Yet, in performing this task, the river is only something 
that that is constantly in flux, “the state of wondering,”63 as 
Heidegger refers to it. As such, it both articulates the endless flow 
of time itself and the wandering of those human tribes that have 
not found, or have been uprooted from their homeland. Yet the 
river is not a mere flux, not a sign of mere homelessness. Even in its 
onward flow it retains the connection to its divine source.64 At the 
same time, Heidegger saw in der Rhein a reversal in its movement. 
This reversal in the river’s flow bespeaks a twofold link between the 
river’s divine origin in the mountains on the one hand and, on the 
other, the openness of the ocean into which it flows.65   In der Ister, this same double movement also hints at the unity 
between East and West, between the Morgenland and Abendland, 
the “ancient” youth of civilization (its morning) and its decline 
(its evening).66 This is, according to Heidegger, between a world 
in which gods communed with mortals and a technologized world 
from which the gods have fled. “Just as the river binds together a 
sequence of profound and powerful polarities, so too its seeming 
backwards flow discloses that, though constantly in flux, it is also a 
figure that abides in the midst of flux.”67 The vision of the two rivers 
thus inaugurates, mediates, and connects the manifold possibilities 
of human dwelling on earth, and of course this includes that mortals’ 
fundamental relatedness to the world of the gods.
Yet, at the same time, everything that can be said about the 
rivers may, without reducing it to mere allegory, can also be said of the poet. The rivers, Heidegger insists, are the poets, although he 
adds that it must be seen as a “poetic word” and not a philosophical 
definition.” He explains:
 60 According to Pattison, Heidegger highlights and Latin and Greek names of The River Danube so 
as to emphasize the connection between Germany and Antiquity and the East. Cf. Stephen Mulhall, ed. 
Martin Heidegger. (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), p. 394. 61 Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 182.
 62 The mountains are the dwelling-place of the gods and of the divine attributes of thunder and 
lightning. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 182. 63  Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 182. 64  Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 183-185 65 Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 185. 66 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p.201. 67 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 203.
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But the rivers are the poets, who establish what is poetic, on 
the ground in which humans dwell. The poetic river-spirit makes 
habitable in an essential sense, preparing for the ground of the hearth 
of the house of history.  The poet opens up the chronotope within which 
belonging to a hearth and being at home become at all possible.68
 
Thus, like the river, the poet may be spoken of as a demi-god, 
as one situated between the world of the gods and the world of men. 
But it may seem as if the poet does something that the river does not. 
For the poet speaks, he names what is Holy for the benefit of both 
gods and men, says Heidegger. He brings the river into language or 
makes of it a sign. But, once again, we must insist, this is not simply 
to turn the river into an allegory or to see it as no more than a sign 
or something else. The river itself needs to be understood as a sign, 
as meaningful in the way that it is meaningful.  The river is not what 
it is except as the sign that it becomes the poetic word.
“The poet speaks of the Holy.” What does this mean for Heidegger? In turning our attention to the Holy (das Heilige), we can find the linkage 
between Being and the divinity. Once again, Heidegger tells us, “The 
thinker utters Being. The poet names what is holy.”69 He is not here 
making a distinction between Being and Holy, as if apportioning reality, one for the philosophers and one for the poets. Daigler pointed out that 
“Being and Holy are intimately related for Heidegger to the extent that 
when philosophers neglect this dimension of Being, they also neglect 
Being itself.”70 What then is the Holy? Heidegger gave us a clue saying:
The wholesome and sound (das Heile) withdraws. The world 
becomes without healing, un-holy (heil-os). Not only does the holy (das 
Heilige), as the track of the godhead, thereby remain concealed; even the 
track to the holy, the hale, and whole (das Heil), seems to be effaced.71The Holy (das Heilige) is derived from das Heil which can mean 
either the whole or else well being.  We can read this in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Hölderlin’s “As when on a Holiday. .” He said: “It (das 
Heilige) is the primordial, and it remains in itself unbroken and ‘whole’ (heil). This originary wholeness gives a gift to everything that is real 
by virtue of its all-presence: it confers the grace of its own abiding 
presence.”72 However, Heidegger also said somewhere that the holy 
is a “dimension.” He wrote: “The holy alone is the essential sphere of 
divinity, which in turn affords a dimension for the gods and for God.”73 
By this Heidegger means that the holy is the condition or sphere for 
 68  Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 204.
 69 “What is Metaphysics? Postscript” in Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 360. 70 Daigler, op. cit., p. 381. 71 Poetry, Language, and Thought, p. 117.
 72 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 85. 73 “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, p. 218.
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the possibility of God’s appearance – for his epiphany. No wonder for 
de Vries: “(the holy) is the inaugural light, that native soil that makes 
possible the advent of God or of the gods.”74 Heidegger gives us another clue in understanding the essence 
of the Holy. In his essay “Building, Dwelling, and Thinking” he alludes to the unity of the Fourfold (Geviert). These Four expressed 
the primal oneness of Earth and Sky, Divinities and Mortals. “(The 
word) ‘on the earth” already means ‘under the sky.’ Both of these 
also mean ‘remaining before divinities’ and include ‘belonging to 
men’s being with one another.’”75  
Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading 
out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal. When we say 
earth, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, but we 
give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.
The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing 
moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their 
changes, the light of the dusk of the day, the gloom and glow of night, the 
clemency and inclemency of weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth 
of the ether. When we say sky, we are already thinking of the other three 
along with it, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.
The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead.  Out of the 
holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws in his 
concealment. When we speak of the divinities, we are already thinking of the other 
three along with them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.
The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they 
can die. To die means to be capable of death as death.  Only man dies, and indeed 
continually, as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before divinities. 
When we speak of mortals, we are already thinking of the other three along 
with them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.76
The earth is that which is “blossoming and fruiting.”  Mortals are 
human beings because they can die.  It is also in the nature of mortals to 
stand and dwell before divinities. And who are the divinities?  Heidegger 
tells us that they are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. 
From these reflections, Heidegger came to a conclusion that “this 
technologized world is”, according to Heidegger, “man’s spiritual distress, 
his destitution.”77 Modernity is age of the flight of the gods, it is a spiritual decline.78 Only by dwelling in “the sight of the gods” can man become 
historical, to become immerse in the simple unity of earth and sky.  
Reaffirming the intimate connection between Being, the Holy, and 
divinities, Heidegger writes in his “Letter on Humanism”:
 74 Hent de Vries, “Theotopographies: Nancy, Hölderlin, and Heidegger.  MLN (Vol. 109, no. 3, 1994), p. 491. 75 Poetry, Language, and Thought, p. 149. 76 Poetry, Language, and Thought, p. 149-150. 77 Poetry, Language, and Thought, p. 91. 78 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 204. We can also find the same theme in another work of Heidegger. Cf. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 38
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Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the Holy be 
thought. Only from the essence of the Holy is the essence of divinity to 
be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought 
or said what the word “God” is to signify.79 
This passage establishes the following sequence: The Truth of Being, the essence of the Holy, the essence of the Divinities, and lastly, 
the proper signification of God. But what then does Heidegger tell us 
about God himself? What is the most proper way to signify God?
In his interpretation of Hölderlin’s poem “As when on a Holiday. . .” 
Heidegger provides one of his most explicit statements on the nature of God:
Hölderlin names nature the holy, because it is “older than the ages 
and above the gods.” However, “holiness” in no way is a property belonging 
to a fixed God (festehenden Gott). The holy is not holy because it is divine, 
but rather divinity is divine because it is in its own way “holy.”80
 
Out of the oneness of the four (earth and sky, mortals and 
divinities), described by Heidegger as the “Holy”, the divinities appear 
and become named. As was already mentioned earlier, he assigned 
the task of naming the gods to the poets. “The writing of poetry is the 
fundamental naming of the gods.”81 This explains why Heidegger thinks 
that the concept “nature”, which is so prevalent in Hölderlin’s poetry 
is explicitly identified with the Greek phusis.82  Phusis is prior to the 
gods, for it is only in the emergence of Being that there is something to 
which the term “god” might apply.  Heidegger approves that the Greeks 
subordinated their gods to Being, and consequently even understood 
this subordination to fate. No wonder, he wrote somewhere that: “Fate (Moira) holds sway of the gods and men, whereas in Christian thought, 
for example, all destiny is the work of the ‘divine providence’ of the 
Creator and the Redeemer.”83 
As a rejoinder, let us emphasize that for Heidegger Hölderlin’s 
poetry is permeated by a deep sadness, a most profound sense of loss and 
absence – of the presence and the flight of the gods. The “fundamental 
mood” or what Heidegger refers to as Grandstimmung is his “holy 
mourning” (heilige Trauer), a mourning for the departure of the gods.84 
This is not supposed to be understood as a psychological phenomenon, 
rather it is a “geistige”, a spiritual-intellectual phenomenon. It is not 
 79 “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, p. 230. 80 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 95. 81 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 61.
 82 Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 55. 83  Parmenides, p. 110-111. 84  Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 65.
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simply an “inner state” but the way the world is disclosed as a whole.85 
In Hölderlin, our world is disclosed, a world permeated by absence. 
“Holy mourning,” (heilige Trauer) according to Heidegger, should 
not be confused with nostalgia.  Rather, it is essentially “creative and 
productive” (schöpferisch-erzeugend). It is creative in thinking of the 
flight of the gods, there is also a projection of coming.86 
CONCLUSION: GOD IN HEIDEGGER’S THOUGHT
Central to Heidegger’s philosophic excursus is the problem of 
Being, that one and single problem that has dominated his works from 
his earliest essays down to his interviews. However, his immersion in 
theology and the Sacred Sciences, combined with his intimate relation 
with Scholasticism, has provided confusion on the place of God in 
his philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger’s reflection on Being and God is 
one replete with ambiguities and vagueness. On the one hand, he is 
questioning the integrity of Christian Theology and philosophy, and 
in another occasion you can hear him speaking about the Sacred, the 
Holy, the divine. In more than one occasion, he is elevating atheism 
as the fundamental stance of the thinker – the philosopher, and in 
another, he is speaking of atheism as an authentic path towards God. 
Amidst these confusions, we ask the question, what is really the place 
of God in Heidegger’s philosophy? And if there is really a God is his 
thought, how does it emerge in his problematization of Being?
The Eternal Recurrence of God as a conceptual problem in 
metaphysics was thrown away by Martin Heidegger. He delegates 
a primordial reflection empowered by thinking and made clearer 
by Dasein’s multi-faceted Transcendence towards Being. This is an 
ontological appreciation, our attunement, whose very ground is our 
worldviews. Heidegger writes: “It (metaphysical thinking) is guided by the anthropological mode of thinking which, no longer comprehending 
the essence of subjectivity, prolongs modern metaphysics while vitiating 
it.  Anthropology as metaphysics is the transition of metaphysics into the 
final configuration: ‘worldview’.  (weltanschauung)”87 It is true that “the 
relationship of man to Being is obscure. Nonetheless, we everywhere 
and continually stand within it and wherever and whenever we 
comport ourselves towards beings.”88 This is the reason why
 85  Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 67-70 86  Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 65-67. 87 Nietszche, vol. 4, p. 149. 88 Ibid., p. 153.
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“The truth of beings contains a projection of the Being of beings.  
But, insofar as man, himself a being, maintains himself in the projection 
of Being and stands in the truth of beings, he must either take the truth 
of beings as a measure for his being-himelf, or must give a measure for 
the truth of beings out of him own being-himself.”89
For Heidegger, theology has yielded to the temptation to be relevant 
and scientific. It is because of this that it has perverted itself into a form 
which is in competition to philosophy.  No wonder Heidegger said:
someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, both the 
theology of the Christian faith and that of philosophy, would today rather 
remain silent about God when he is speaking in the realm of thinking.
. . . causa sui: This is the right name for the God of philosophy.  Man can 
neither pray nor sacrifice to this God.  Man can neither fall to his knees in awe 
before the causa sui nor can he play music and dance before this God.90 
No wonder, rarely do we hear the name of Heidegger in the 
theological circles. But we can see clearly here the reason why he is 
not really considered in theology is that he is chose to bind himself 
to Being, to metaphysics, which, for him, is not suited for speaking 
religious themes. Heidegger has obviously devoted his acumen 
insisting that metaphysics is judged as ineffectual of speaking about 
God.  Rather, the metaphysician thinks conceptually and abstractly.  He 
expressed this most explicitly in the “Contributions to Philosophy”:
For being is never a determination of God himself, but is that which 
the divinization of God needs, to remain nonetheless completely distinct 
from being. Being is neither (like the beingness of metaphysics) the highest 
and purest determination of theion and Deus and the “Absolute,” nor is 
it – a notion which goes with this interpretation – the most general and 
emptiest covering term for everything that is not nothing.91
As we have already seen previously, for Heidegger, Being is the event of appropriation (Ereignis), and this event is the source of 
God and gods.  In that case, it is distinct from the “beingness” which, 
according to Heidegger, is essential to the notion of Being as a name of God (e.g. ipsum esse).  The point here is not that metaphysics cannot 
speak something about God, rather, Heidegger maintains Western 
metaphysics has a fundamental commitment to Being which blinds it 
to this experienced meaning. However, there is a sense of the “Holy” 
which the experience of thinking, of philosophical reflection, points to. 
 89 Ibid., p. 151.
 90 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 17.
 91 Contributions to Philosophy, p. 240.
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Now, a very crucial dimension of Heidegger’s thought was his 
involvement with the poets, and not just any poet, but the poet Hölderlin. 
It was Hölderlin’s notion of the “Holy”, the das Heilige, which provides 
for us a viable direction in our path to answer the question posited 
above.  Heidegger’s references to “The Holy” seems in consonance with 
the qualities of “Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans” as properties of 
what is meant by “The Holy”.  Yet “The Holy” is not a property, it is not a 
quality of objects, and the reason for this lies on the fact that Heidegger 
was against any form of value thinking.
The basic premise of value thinking is that the fundamental level of 
the phenomenon disclosing itself is its present-before-us as thingliness.92 
The ontologizing of values, which is for Heidegger can be traced back to 
ontologizing the essences, assumes that we have to perceive the thing, 
the phenomenon, and then eventually affixed some value or significance 
to it. Through the appreciation of something as a value, what is esteemed 
is permitted to become merely as an object standing in correlation to the 
approval of the person.  This is, in fact, what Heidegger would eventually 
refer to as “the subjectivising of what is valued.”93 
Now the treatment of God as the “highest value” is actually a 
degradation of the essence of God. Furthermore, it is the “highest 
blasphemy against the meaning of Being.”94 Any discussion of God in 
terms of value is a distortion, of how concealment becomes manifest. 
However, it must be noted that certain modes of presencing enables 
unconcealment to become manifest thereby it makes possible the 
presencing of the Holy. Heidegger is of course referring to art.  Now, if the 
unconcealment within the province of art happens, Heidegger reflects:
Dignity and splendour are not properties, next to which and 
behind which the god stands, but in the dignity and in the splendour 
the god becomes present. In the reflection of this splendour there 
radiates, that is, there is lighted up, what we have called world.95 
Furthermore, in a different occasion, Heidegger speaks of nihilism 
which is summed up in Nietzsche’s word: “God is dead”. Heidegger did not interpret it not as personal attitude or character to be refuted on the sole basis of church attendance or even apologetic proofs regarding the 
existence of God. It is, first and foremost, an event, an unfolding of Western 
metaphysics which is nearer to us than all the things in our everyday life. 
Moreover, nihilism too is the condition for that possibility.  Man has forgotten 
his place, in history, his dwelling in the earth, and the Holy is not in the 
 92 Being and Time, p. 99.
 93 Being and Time, p. 101.
 94 “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, p. 232-233.
 95 Poetry, Language, and Thought, p. 44.
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established places. The projection of the really real supersensible reality 
has lost its influence and life-giving powers. And for Heidegger, Christianity 
has contributed most to the withdrawal of the Holy by becoming onto-
theo-logical and a worldly cultural power.96 Man’s propensity to dwell in 
the proximity of the divine is so obfuscated that even the absence of god is not even discerned properly. An explication of this can be read in one of 
Heidegger’s study of the poet Hölderlin. He explains:
The world’s night is spreading its darkness. The era is defined by the 
god’s failure to arrive, by the “missingness of God.”  But the missingness of God 
which Hölderlin experienced does not deny that the Christian relationship 
with God lives on in individuals and in the churches, still less does it assess this 
relationship negatively. The missingness of God means that no god any longer 
gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocally, and by such 
gathering disposes the world’s history and man’s sojourn in it. The missingness 
of God forebodes something even grimmer, however.  Not only have the gods 
and the god fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished in the 
world’s history. The time of the world’s night is the destitute time, because 
it becomes ever more destitute.  It has already grown so destitute it can no 
longer discern the missingness of God as missingness.97 
For Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poetic word is the event of the Holy (das 
Ereignis des Heiligen),98 where Being gives itself as a sparing nearness. 
However, once the word is spoken, it slips away from the care of the poet 
himself.  “Therefore”, Heidegger concludes, “the poet turns to the others, 
that their commemoration (Andenken) helps the poetizing word to be 
understood, so that in understanding, the homecoming (Heimkunft) 
occasions itself for each as is appropriate to him.”99 Having been spoken, 
the poetic word must be properly interpreted, that is, appropriated.
Appropriation is the task of the thinker, who, like the poet strives 
to bring Being to word.  But the thinker must interpret the resonance 
of the word with a view toward understanding Being as a ground for 
beings. This calls for a discursivity and a reflective orientation within 
a tradition not required of poetry.  Nevertheless, the two are mutually 
dependent. Where thinking needs poetic utterance as a point of departure into the concealed history of Being, poetry needs ontological 
interpretation, or appropriation, to sustain and further determine its 
voice. In its appropriation of the word, thought traces the history of 
Being insofar as Being spares itself from utterance. The thinker must, therefore, cleave to the unspoken resonating through the presence 
of the word, and, in doing so, preserve the word as “saying”. Thus 
Heidegger attunes his discourse to the poetic voice of Hölderlin.
 96 Cf. Philosophical and Political Writings, p. 142.
 97 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 193, also, refer to “Why Poets?” in Off the Beaten Track, p. 205.
 98 Cf. Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 72
 99 Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, p. 73-74
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